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THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE ISRAEL  
DEFENSE FORCES
Avi Jager
 Over the past decade, Israel’s military—the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)—has enacted major changes to its structure and war-fighting priorities. Infantry, ar-
mor, and artillery forces have been reduced and ordered to implement structural and 
doctrinal changes to make them more relevant to anticipated future conflicts against 
Hamas and Hezbollah. Naval and air forces expanded their unconventional ca-
pacities at the expense of their conventional-warfare capabilities. Equally important, 
while Israel has allocated vast resources toward strengthening its defensive forma-
tions, the IDF has prioritized expanding cyber and intelligence units above all others.
The driving forces behind these changes were the rise of nonstate adversaries, 
the declining threat from neighboring nation-states, and groundbreaking inno-
vations in military technology. The implications of this transformation for Israel’s 
security and military preparedness are potentially severe. Hamas and Hezbollah 
have kept developing new ways to challenge Israel actively, which has responded 
principally by developing defensive measures to protect against these new threats 
rather than engaging with the sources of those threats offensively. Nonetheless, 
contending with the existential threats Israeli security experts foresee on the 
horizon—a multifront war with hundreds of thousands of missiles and rockets 
targeting Israeli population centers—could require deploying ground forces to 
capture areas in the Gaza Strip, southern Lebanon, Syria, and perhaps even Iraq 
and Iran. Since the IDF ground forces have been reduced, deprioritized, and 
neglected, they will encounter much greater difficulty achieving those objectives.
This article uses interviews with IDF intelligence analysts, security research-
ers, and past and present defense ministry personnel to present a comprehensive 
survey of these changes and reforms across the IDF, their sources, and their 
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operational implications. Among the interviewees were the alternate prime min-
ister of Israel, Lieutenant General (Ret.) Benjamin (Benny) Gantz, former defense 
minister and chief of general staff Lieutenant General (Ret.) Moshe Ya’alon, and 
former IDF comptroller Major General (Ret.) Yitzhak Brick. In addition, ten 
IDF intelligence analysts and commanders of varying ranks and specializations 
were interviewed. The remaining data were collected from official publications 
of government agencies, military publications, archival materials and protocols, 
and over one thousand testimonies of IDF soldiers and reservists.
THE SOURCES OF IDF TRANSFORMATION
The primary reason for the IDF’s transformation was a deliberate decision by 
Israel’s political and military leadership to strengthen the country’s defensive 
formations, prioritize cyber and intelligence capabilities, and implement struc-
tural and methodological changes to make the IDF more relevant to future wars 
with nonstate actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Benny Gantz, who currently 
serves as Israel’s alternate prime minister and who led the IDF during this trans-
formation period as chief of general staff, explained its rationale as follows:
[T]he purpose of [these changes] was to create a smaller yet deadlier army, capable of 
confronting non-state adversaries in complex environments and on multiple fronts. 
. . . The ability to be a smaller yet deadlier military depends primarily on the ability 
to obtain accurate intelligence, process and analyze it effectively, and transfer it to the 
combat forces in real time. . . .
I am saying, unambiguously, that I prioritized cyber and intelligence over infantry 
and armor . . . [;] unlike the threat of ground invasion, the threat of cyber is realistic.1
Indeed, Israel’s political consensus is that the last conventional military threat 
to Israel, the Syrian state, evaporated almost entirely during the civil war that 
began there in 2011. Until then, Israel had considered a conventional war with 
Syria to be a likely conflict scenario. Unlike Jordan and Egypt, Syria never signed 
a peace agreement with Israel, nor did it establish any diplomatic or economic 
relations. Syria confronted Israel directly in 1948, 1967, 1973, and 1982, and 
continued to require mass conscription for its army. In 2011, the Arab Spring 
spread to Syria and put the al-Assad regime on the cusp of extinction. The Syrian 
armed forces suffered tremendous losses following the outbreak of the civil war, 
from both casualties and defections. As a result, the regime lost territory and 
sovereignty to such an extent that it had to rely on foreign support to preserve 
its rule. Syria’s declining demographic and economic stability, combined with 
its deteriorating military power, led Israel to judge that the al-Assad regime no 
longer was a central threat to its national security, at least over the short term.2
The structural and doctrinal changes to the IDF were, by and large, the op-
erational and organizational response to the gradual transformation of Hamas 
3
Jager: The Transformation of the Israel Defense Forces
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
 JAG E R  1 5
and Hezbollah from local resistance movements into powerful militant orga-
nizations. Within twenty-five years, Hamas has transformed from a grassroots 
socioreligious movement into a political regime with a military wing consisting 
of over thirty thousand combatants and an arsenal of approximately twenty 
thousand rockets capable of reaching targets two hundred kilometers away.3 
Hezbollah has undergone an even greater organizational transformation, from 
a grassroots political movement into what many experts consider to be the most 
powerful nonstate military force in the world, with an estimated fifty to sixty 
thousand fighters and more than a hundred thousand rockets.4 Hezbollah’s tac-
tical skill set evolved drastically as a result of its experience in the Syrian civil 
war and it now is capable of carrying out offensive attacks beyond Lebanon’s 
borders and on Israel’s home front.5 Hamas’s and Hezbollah’s combat experience, 
firepower, and confidence have elevated their status in the eyes of the Israeli 
military leadership, which regards them as being among the primary military 
threats to Israel’s security now.6
THE IDF’S NEW BATTLEGROUP FORMATION
In the summer of 2015, the IDF launched the Gideon multi-year plan (GMYP) 
under General Gantz to shrink, modernize, and reform the Israeli military to 
meet the asymmetric, nonstate adversary threats that now were prioritized 
over its traditional state-on-state warfare mission. The IDF cut combat and 
noncombat forces alike and across both active and reserve military formations. 
The IDF standing army was instructed to cut 10 percent of the commissioned 
and warrant officer posts and reduce their total number from 45,000 to 40,000 
troops.7 The size of conscripted forces was reduced as well; the length of male 
conscripted service was shortened by four months, and it is expected to be 
reduced by an additional two months in the coming years.8 The reserve forces 
were affected most by the GMYP, which suggested cutting 30 percent of the re-
serve army, which meant releasing one hundred thousand out of three hundred 
thousand active reservists.9
Perhaps the most profound change suggested by the GMYP was the reorga-
nization of the IDF’s combat formations. Since the founding of the IDF, the di-
visional formation had been the IDF’s core operational battle group.10 Following 
the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the decline of conventional warfare and the rise of 
nonstate adversaries led to an erosion of the divisional framework as the IDF’s 
primary battle formation. As time went on, the IDF operated in smaller areas 
of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and southern Lebanon that did not require, nor 
could they accommodate, large task forces. The IDF’s missions no longer were 
to occupy vast adversary-state territory but, instead, to gain operational control 
over geographically limited hostile areas and eliminate localized threats such as 
missile capabilities and arms-smuggling tunnels. The capabilities of the nonstate 
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adversaries against which the IDF increasingly was being tasked—disorganized 
militias in southern Lebanon and local Palestinian terrorist cells in the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip—as advanced as they were, did not justify deploying entire 
divisions. Furthermore, deploying large task forces could have resulted in more 
casualties, more collateral damage, and ineffective use of the combat forces.
In 2011, the IDF began implementing a new operational doctrine that es-
tablished brigades as independent battle groups instead of division-sized for-
mations, each capable of planning and executing ground maneuvers without 
divisional support.11 The new brigade battlegroup formation consisted of six 
battalions, including infantry, armor, artillery, and combat-engineering forces. 
In addition, each battalion now could communicate directly with the air force 
and navy for exfiltration or 
fire support. To allow better 
control and coordination be-
tween the different battalions, 
each brigade battle group was 
given its own command-and-
control headquarters. These 
headquarters were in continuous communication with other field forces, as well 
as with parallel forces and the senior commander. Brigades were now responsible 
for managing their own logistics, rearmament, and tactical extractions.12
The primary purpose of the new battlegroup formation was to create a fight-
ing force that would be more relevant in future conflicts against Hezbollah 
and Hamas. Israel expects its future conflicts will be characterized by dynamic 
adversaries that constantly change their structure and methods, in addition to 
acquiring new techniques and weaponry. The shift to smaller battle groups with 
the combined capabilities of different corps and the ability independently to plan 
and execute battle plans increases the IDF’s effectiveness and flexibility.13
In turn, this reform of the IDF’s primary fighting formations had profound im-
pacts on the organization of the army branches and corps that contributed forces 
to the new brigades.
Infantry
In recent years, the IDF reduced the size of its combat infantry forces and ex-
panded the constabulary forces that guard Israel’s borders and the occupied 
territories. In 2005, the IDF established a new infantry brigade to specialize in 
those security missions, the Kfir Brigade. The Kfir Brigade was larger than most 
combat infantry brigades; IDF infantry brigades usually consist of four battal-
ions, whereas the Kfir Brigade consisted of five battalions. The brigade’s purpose 
The driving forces behind these changes were 
the rise of nonstate adversaries, the declining 
threat from neighboring nation-states, and 
groundbreaking innovations in military  
technology.
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was to maintain a permanent presence in the West Bank to perform routine se-
curity missions, protect the Israeli settlements, and prevent infiltration attempts 
into Israel.14 Between 2004 and 2017, to perform border-protection and routine 
security missions across Israel’s borders, the IDF established four more similar 
battalions: the Caracal, Lions of the Jordan Valley, Cheetah (Bardelas), and Lion 
of the Valley battalions.15
The IDF’s combat infantry units, after experiencing a significant reduction in 
manpower following the decision to reduce the length of compulsory military 
service, began focusing their training on combating guerrilla warfare and prepar-
ing for future conflicts against Hezbollah and Hamas. The basic training of IDF 
infantry units is divided into two parts, general training and specialized training. 
The IDF has not changed the general training style and requirements significantly 
over the last several decades. The first part of the basic training is focused on fun-
damentals. These include preparing, using, and maintaining a personal rifle; walk-
ing long distances with heavy weight; team protocols such as battle formations 
and movement; and military sign language and chain-of-command structures. 
The second part of the basic training is conducted after the soldiers are assigned 
to their individual specializations: squad leaders, advanced marksmen, machine 
gunners, grenade gunners, shoulder-fired-missile operators, medics, or riflemen. 
In this phase, they learn about the theory and practice of their respective roles and 
undergo extensive training and tests to qualify as fully operationally proficient.16
In contrast, the specialized training of IDF infantry soldiers has seen substan-
tial changes in response to Israel’s changing adversary priorities. In the past, the 
specialized training focused on open-field warfare techniques. This included 
individual, squad, platoon, and company open-field-warfare drills, focused on 
capturing and holding strategic geographic positions to support seizing and 
controlling large swaths of territory. Urban warfare was practiced only rarely 
and underground warfare and fighting techniques in tunnels and underground 
fortifications were excluded entirely from the training curriculum of standard 
infantry units. The most basic principle regarding underground installations and 
urban areas was simply to avoid them. However, from 2014 onward, the special-
ized training focused on urban warfare and introduced underground warfare as 
a new concept with its own combat doctrine. Open-battlefield warfare practices, 
such as occupying Syrian and Egyptian fortifications, were removed from spe-
cialized training programs.
Armored Corps
Historically, the two fundamental principles of the IDF armored corps were 
mobility and speed; the underlying logic behind these principles was to lever-
age the armored corps’s unique movement capabilities to minimize its exposure 
and vulnerability.17 The IDF exploited these capabilities to achieve decisive 
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victories against conventional enemy forces. During the Suez crisis of 1956, the 
38th Armored Division, led by Ariel Sharon, penetrated the armistice line with 
Egypt along the Sinai Peninsula and captured the strategically crucial Abu-Ageila 
military compound.18 During the Six-Day War of 1967, the IDF armored corps 
bypassed Egyptian defensive lines on the southern front and captured the eastern 
bank of the Suez Canal within two days.19 In the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the 
armored corps pushed Syrian forces to retreat from the Golan Heights and then 
breached their lines to establish a forward offensive position only forty kilome-
ters from Damascus.20 These conflicts all were characterized by open-battlefield 
warfare, and the guiding principle on urban warfare at the time was to avoid it 
unless it was essential to the mission.
Over the years, the battle space and adversaries shifted away from that tra-
ditional paradigm toward more-urban conflict environments, and the armored 
corps’s role in subsequent operations diminished. The armored corps, like the 
rest of the IDF, went from fighting open-field warfare against conventional 
armies to conducting urban warfare against nonstate adversaries. In urban 
warfare, armored units are unwieldy, less effective, and more vulnerable than in 
rural environments. Urban defenders have inherent advantages; they can prepare 
strong defensive formations and fortifications, lure their adversary into vulner-
able positions, and move unexposed across infrastructure and populations. An 
armored attacker, on the other hand, has limited ability to navigate, mobilize, 
and communicate with other forces, especially as part of a diverse battle group.
The Lebanon war of 2006 illustrated armored units’ diminishing effectiveness 
in urban and asymmetric warfare environments. During the first three weeks of 
fighting, the armored corps and the rest of the IDF ground forces waited in stag-
ing areas while air forces engaged Hezbollah. When the ground invasion com-
menced, only two of four active armored brigades participated, using just 370 of 
the estimated four thousand tanks in the Israeli inventory. The missions assigned 
to armored units in Lebanon were also much different than in Israel’s previous 
conflicts. Instead of penetrating deep into southern Lebanon, the armored corps 
carried out raids against suspected Hezbollah compounds near the border. It 
also engaged in routine security missions, such as patrolling an operational route 
leading from Israel to southern Lebanon, performed rescue missions, and pro-
vided logistical support (e.g., transporting food, water, ammunition, and equip-
ment to the other fighting forces).21
To remain relevant, the IDF armored corps significantly reduced its size and 
changed its structure to adapt to Israel’s evolving security challenges. According 
to former deputy chief of general staff Major General (Ret.) Yair Nave, more than 
ten reserve brigades were eliminated over the last decade.22 Still more brigades are 
expected to be phased out as the IDF continues to downsize its armored corps. 
7
Jager: The Transformation of the Israel Defense Forces
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
 JAG E R  1 9
In addition, instead of having four to six armored companies in each battalion 
of the remaining tank brigades, they are being reorganized to have three tank 
companies, two infantry companies, and one combat-engineering company.23 
With this mix of forces, armored units now can operate independently as small 
task forces, complete a wider variety of missions, and operate more effectively 
in urban-warfare environments. These changes to the armored corps’s structure 
and its integration into the new battlegroup formations made armored units 
much more relevant and effective in Operation PROTECTIVE EDGE of 2014 than 
they had been in other recent conflicts. The operation employed all four active 
armored brigades for the first time in thirty-two years, and five hundred tanks 
took part in the fighting. The armored corps suffered fourteen fatalities in the 
operation, but all these were caused by mortar fire outside the Gaza Strip or by 
sniper fire against personnel while outside their vehicle; no IDF tanks were de-
stroyed or permanently incapacitated by enemy fire.24
Artillery
During the first decades of Israel’s existence, the official mission of the IDF artil-
lery corps was to provide covering fire for the maneuvering forces. The artillery 
corps played a key role in Israel’s armed conflicts in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 
Six-Day War of 1967, the IDF artillery corps destroyed twenty-six of forty Syr-
ian missile batteries and provided covering fire for the maneuvering IDF ground 
forces, enabling them to capture the Syrian Golan Heights within two days of 
fighting. In the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the artillery corps divided its attention 
between two fronts. The Drakon battalion was instrumental in blocking the Syr-
ian armed forces from advancing in the north while the rest of the corps enabled 
the IDF’s counterattack against the Egyptian armed forces in the Sinai Peninsula.25
However, as with the fate of the IDF’s armored corps, the waning of conven-
tional warfare reduced the artillery corps’s relevance in Israel’s modern conflicts. 
Since the Yom Kippur War of 1973, no foreign military has attempted to invade 
Israel and the IDF conducted multidivision ground maneuvers only once, during 
the Lebanon war of 1982. More importantly, when IDF combat forces penetrated 
hostile areas, battlefield conditions limited the ability of the artillery corps to 
provide fire support. The large kill radius of artillery shells combined with their 
inability to hit targets with sufficient precision increased the risk of friendly fire 
or of excessive collateral damage, limiting artillery’s useful role in the conflict.
The artillery corps began reforming and reorganizing itself to address the 
changing operational environment that the IDF faced by the time the second in-
tifada began in 2000. In the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
Israeli military leadership established two new secretive units within the artillery 
corps to address the mismatch between the corps’s traditional capabilities and 
the needs of a more urban battlefield. Instead of artillery weapons, the new units 
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were equipped with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to conduct assault and 
reconnaissance missions.
The assault UAV unit, called Zik or Unit 5252, operates the Israeli-made 
Hermes 450 UAV. The Hermes 450 is a multirole, high-performance, tacti-
cal UAV capable of collecting intelligence, conducting electronic warfare, and 
launching missiles.26 The main virtue of the Zik unit is its ability to use precision-
guided munitions to launch surgical strikes, thus minimizing collateral damage 
and threatening distant and hidden targets.
The reconnaissance UAV unit, called Sky Rider or Unit 5353, operates the 
Israeli-made Skylark I, II, and III UAVs.27 The Skylark is a miniature, modular, 
and autonomous UAV; it is small enough to be packed up and carried by ground 
forces and deployed within minutes. The UAV is equipped with advanced com-
munication features that allow it to pass real-time, high-resolution videos, day or 
night, within a forty-kilometer radius.28 The role of the Sky Rider unit is different 
from other UAV units, as its primary mission is to deliver real-time, tactical intel-
ligence directly to junior combat officers on the battlefield.29
The innovative Zik and Sky Rider units presaged other paradigm shifts within 
the IDF artillery corps. In 2014, the artillery corps created a new Detection Unit, 
whose original mission was to 
identify, monitor, and report on 
the trajectory of missiles and 
rockets fired into and out of 
Israel.30 The Detection Unit also 
collected meteorological data 
to pass on to weapons system 
operators. The unit deployed 
sensors at various altitudes using several unique platforms. These sensors col-
lected meteorological data such as air pressure, humidity, wind, and tempera-
ture, which are critical for making accurate ballistic calculations and increasing 
weapon accuracy. The data were used to improve the accuracy and effectiveness 
of artillery guns, UAVs, and precision-guided missiles.31 As the artillery corps’s 
tools changed, its personnel structure was reduced or reallocated significantly. 
In the past decade, half the IDF reserve artillery brigades were disestablished, 
their equipment was sold or scrapped, and the reservists who had served in these 
brigades were released or assigned to regular infantry brigades.32 This left the IDF 
with four active artillery brigades and four reserve artillery battalions.33
AIR FORCE
In the first decades of Israel’s existence and in its early military conflicts, the 
Israeli Air Force (IAF) was tasked with supporting the ground forces as they 
The IDF’s missions no longer were to occupy 
vast adversary-state territory but, instead, to 
gain operational control over geographically 
limited hostile areas and eliminate localized 
threats such as missile capabilities and arms-
smuggling tunnels.
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progressed toward and captured enemy territory, and with maintaining aerial 
superiority. To achieve this, the IAF operated under two guiding principles that 
persist to this day, in some respects. The first principle was the element of sur-
prise; because the IAF had limited air resources compared with the combined air 
assets of the Arab alliance that Israel faced in its early years, it was vital to opera-
tional success for the IAF to strike adversaries first.34 The IAF’s second principle, 
also driven by its relative size, was to concentrate its effort against a single front or 
objective before moving on to the next one, rather than dividing into small task 
forces to attack multiple targets simultaneously.35
The Six-Day War of 1967 illustrated the decisiveness of these principles in 
practice. The war commenced with a surprise aerial attack against Egypt, focus-
ing on its airfields and aircraft while they were still on the ground. Within five 
hours, the IAF performed 347 sorties and destroyed more than three hundred 
Egyptian fighter jets and eleven Egyptian military airfields.36 The IAF then car-
ried out 125 sorties against targets in Syria and Jordan, destroying most of the 
Syrian air force and severely damaging the Jordanian air force. The IAF suffered 
twenty-four fatalities and lost forty-six fighter jets.37
Six years later, the IAF faced the reverse scenario. On 6 October 1973, Egypt 
and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel. The IAF first had to defend Israel’s 
airspace; only then could it go on the offensive. The IAF also was challenged by 
Egypt’s and Syria’s newly acquired, Soviet-made antiaircraft systems, which they 
purchased pursuant to the lessons of the previous conflict.38 Unlike the Six-Day 
War, the Yom Kippur War lasted almost three weeks, and the IAF suffered ninety-
two fatalities and lost 103 fighter jets.39
In the wake of these wars, the IAF worked to improve its aerial dogfighting 
capabilities, procure new technologies to defeat Soviet antiaircraft systems, and 
increase the accuracy and efficacy of its strikes against enemy targets. In 1978, 
Israel purchased seventy-five Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter 
jets, designed for stealth and air-to-ground attacks, and the McDonnell Doug-
las F-15A Eagle, designed for aerial dogfighting against adversary jets.40 These 
modernizations led to improved IAF performance during the 1982 Lebanon war. 
Over ninety days of operations, the IAF destroyed Syria’s Soviet-made antiaircraft 
systems and shot down a hundred Syrian fighter jets, with zero losses to IAF air 
forces.41
However, as Israel increasingly became engaged in low-intensity conflict 
against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Hamas, and Hezbollah, the 
IAF’s operational role in Israel’s military campaigns decreased. Israel’s nonstate 
adversaries diminished the relevance of Israel’s air superiority by adopting guer-
rilla tactics. They operated in small groups; carried out low-profile operations in 
unexpected locations; and used light weapons, suicide bombers, and rockets. To 
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protect themselves, they moved constantly, kept strict secrecy about the locations 
of their military installations, and assimilated themselves into civilian popula-
tions and infrastructure. During the first and second intifadas, the IAF made 
a significant contribution to Israel’s attempt to achieve military victory but was 
much less influential to the outcome than the ground forces. During the Lebanon 
war of 2006, IAF operations were lethal and efficient but failed to influence the 
results of the war. Over thirty-three days, the IAF executed eighteen thousand 
sorties and destroyed thousands of rocket launchers and military installations.42 
But throughout that period, Hezbollah continued to launch rockets into Israel, 
showing Israeli military leadership that the IAF’s dominance was no longer a 
guarantor of victory in battle.
Toward the end of that decade, the IAF began prioritizing precision-strike ac-
curacy and stealth over air-to-air and air-to-ground attack capabilities. These ca-
pabilities were vital to Israel’s attempt to prevent advanced weapons systems from 
reaching Hamas and Hezbollah. This allowed the IAF to conduct long-distance 
air operations to carry out precision strikes far beyond Israel’s border areas, such 
as in Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, while leaving no footprint or signature that 
could be attributed to Israel. Perhaps the highest national priority for the IAF was 
to maintain and demonstrate the ability to attack and destroy hardened nuclear 
facilities by air in remote and hostile territories, as it did in 1981 against Iraq’s 
Osirak reactor, and later in Syria. Following its successful strike against the Syrian 
nuclear reactor in 2007, the IAF prepared for a potential attack against what were 
suspected widely to be Iranian nuclear facilities.43
These sensitive strike missions had significant implications for the IAF’s force 
composition and engagement. In 2015, the Israeli defense ministry procured four-
teen Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II fighter jets, which were added to nineteen 
units Israel had purchased already.44 The F-35, while not suited for dogfights, 
has improved stealth capabilities and can reach distant and remote targets easily, 
conduct air-to-surface attacks, and even deploy some nuclear-armed missiles.45 
Simultaneously, Israel also expanded its UAV arsenal and doubled its fleet of Lock-
heed Martin C-130J Super Hercules aerial-refueling aircraft, expanding Israel’s 
ability to attack remote targets at long distances.46 These advanced acquisitions 
strained IAF budget constraints, forcing the IAF to deprioritize other capabilities. 
To save money, the IAF decided to disestablish several combat squadrons, includ-
ing squadrons of F-15 and F-16A/B fighters and Bell AH-1 Cobra helicopters.47
NAVY
Israel shares many of the characteristics of an island, in that it is surrounded 
alternately by adversarial states or territories and the Mediterranean Sea. Is-
rael has maritime borders with Egypt, Jordan, Hezbollah-controlled southern 
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Lebanon, and the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. Having a small population and 
limited natural resources, Israel always has been challenged to provide for its 
own subsistence and, therefore, has been reliant on imports via the sea. In fact, 
over the years, 98 percent of Israel’s imported goods have entered through the 
Mediterranean and Red Seas.48 With over 80 percent of Israel’s population spread 
across its 197 kilometers of coastline, this area is especially vulnerable to attacks.49 
Moreover, much of Israel’s critical infrastructure facilities, such as power stations, 
ports, military installations, communication channels, and water desalination 
facilities, are located near or along Israel’s coast.
That being the case, protecting trade routes, securing Israel’s territorial wa-
ters, and guarding the coastline are the Israeli navy’s most vital missions. Israel’s 
dependence on seaborne imports makes the need to maintain open sea routes 
especially important during wartime. Israel’s navy was designed to engage Egypt’s 
and Syria’s Soviet-backed navies, which Israeli leadership viewed as the primary 
maritime threat.50 To that end, the Israeli navy procured destroyers, missile boats, 
versatile patrol boats, and two submarines.51 To minimize dependence on mili-
tary imports, Israeli Military Industries developed maritime weaponry such as 
the Gabriel missile system, designed specifically for surface naval warfare.52
During the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Israeli navy defeated the Egyptian 
and Syrian navies while suffering no ship or personnel losses of its own.53 As 
with the ground forces, the quantitative power balance at sea seemingly tilted 
heavily toward Egypt and Syria, which enjoyed significant superiority in terms 
of warships and firepower. The Israeli navy had fourteen missile boats against 
Egypt and Syria’s combined twenty-four missile boats. Just prior to the war, the 
Israeli navy had decommissioned its two old submarines, leaving a significant 
capability gap against the Egyptian navy’s twelve active submarines. Nonetheless, 
the Israeli navy destroyed or captured twenty-four enemy vessels while suffering 
only minimal damage and personnel casualties. Throughout the entire war, the 
Israeli navy managed to keep Israel’s ports safe and most of the Mediterranean 
trade routes open, which permitted a continuous flow of energy and other sup-
plies to Israel.54 Most importantly, the Israeli navy pushed those rival navies out 
of Israel’s territorial waters and ensured that no Israeli coastal city was attacked 
from the sea during the conflict.55
After the 1973 war, the diminishing likelihood of a maritime battle with rival 
navies and increasing tension with nonstate adversaries led the Israeli military 
leadership to direct the navy to invest more resources in maritime-security 
missions to prevent attacks against Israeli citizens.56 The navy decommissioned 
all of its destroyers and large missile boats and began purchasing patrol boats 
and small- and medium-size missile boats.57 These changes came at a price. The 
navy was criticized for not making a sufficient contribution to the 2006 Lebanon 
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war. Two days into the war, Hezbollah launched two C-802 antiship cruise mis-
siles against an Israeli Sa’ar 5–class corvette, killing four members of the ship’s 
crew. The Winograd commission of inquiry into the war concluded that the 
navy operated in a mind-set of conducting policing operations rather than 
an offensive military conflict, leading crewmembers to disregard Hezbollah’s 
lethality and threat.58
In 2007, the navy took on responsibility for enforcing the blockade of the Gaza 
Strip.59 The Gaza conflicts and the continuous attempts by militant groups to 
infiltrate Israel via the sea or to break the blockade demanded that the navy play 
this growing role in routine security operations. In 2011, the navy added another 
routine security mission: the protection of Israel’s newly discovered offshore 
natural gas fields.60 Between 
2009 and 2012, Israel discov-
ered several gas fields with an 
estimated 680 billion cubic 
meters of natural gas.61 The 
discovery of the gas reserves 
led Israel to begin switching 
its power-generation infra-
structure to use natural gas, 
meaning that a successful attack against those gas fields could jeopardize Israel’s 
energy security.62 The navy was instructed to provide a tiered defense of Israel’s 
offshore energy infrastructure, including the gas wells, platforms, and underwa-
ter pipelines.63
In 2011, Israel purchased three additional submarines from Germany, dou-
bling its fleet to six hulls.64 While the German manufacturer was responsible 
for building the submarine hulls, Israeli teams were responsible for the combat 
systems and weapons that were installed on board. These included advanced 
radar and communication systems, electronic warfare systems, equipment for 
deploying special forces divers to infiltrate hostile areas, and the ability to launch 
torpedoes and cruise missiles with conventional and unconventional warheads 
and ranges up to 1,500 kilometers.65 The main catalyst for the latest submarine 
purchase was Iran’s pursuit of nuclear-weapons capabilities. The IDF was in-
structed to prepare for two possible scenarios to address Iran’s nuclear ambitions. 
The first was that Israel would launch an attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities. 
In this case, Israel should be able to threaten Iran with a nuclear response in case 
the latter decided to retaliate with other strategic weapons. In the second scenario 
Iran would develop a nuclear weapon and threaten to use it against Israel. In this 
case, Israel would expand its deterrence to make sure Iran comprehended that an 
attack on Israel most likely would lead to mutual destruction.66
[B]y 2011 the IDF prioritized cyber defense 
as the most pressing need within the  
military, and new recruits who were eligible 
for combat service but also passed cyber  
units’ requirements were sent directly to  
the cyber units.
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SPECIAL FORCES
The IDF special forces can be classified into four groups. 
1. The elite units: General Staff Reconnaissance Unit (Sayeret Matkal),  
naval commandos (Shayetet 13), air force commandos (Shaldag), and  
the Special Operations Engineering Unit (Yahalom)
2. The commando units: Egoz, Maglan, and Duvdevan
3. The reconnaissance units: Paratroopers Reconnaissance Battalion,  
Golani Reconnaissance Battalion, Givati Reconnaissance Battalion,  
Nahal Reconnaissance Battalion, and 401st and 7th Reconnaissance  
Battalions
4. The specialized units: 669 Unit for airborne combat search and rescue, 
canine unit (Oketz), 504 Unit of the Human Intelligence Division, and 
Moran Unit for precision-guided missiles
Despite the profusion of special-operations units in the IDF, on only two oc-
casions did the special forces make a significant contribution to the outcome of 
a war. The first was during the Suez crisis of 1956, in which the paratroopers 
were deployed behind enemy lines to the Mitla Pass in the Sinai Peninsula. The 
second was during the 1967 Six-Day War, when the paratroopers again deployed 
behind enemy lines to Abu-Ageila, also in the Sinai Peninsula.67 The IDF’s elite, 
commando, reconnaissance, and specialized units have not affected the outcome 
of any other wars decisively. In most cases, they either received small and insig-
nificant, yet complex, missions or were annexed to an operational brigade and 
fought under its command.
Following twenty-four years of low-intensity conflict in southern Lebanon, 
the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, the IDF special forces’ ability to contribute 
decisively to a large-scale military campaign had reached its nadir. The Winograd 
Commission for the inquiry into the Lebanon war of 2006 concluded that the IDF 
did not make effective use of its special forces. According to the report, special 
forces were scattered across the IDF and were subordinated to various com-
mands: “the decentralized command of the special forces damaged their ability to 
constitute a significant force . . . [which explains their] limited contribution to the 
greater strategic cause.” The committee went so far as to conclude that some IDF 
special-forces units had been established to deal with specific operational chal-
lenges and that many of these challenges no longer existed. Pride and comradery 
prevented these units from pivoting their focus or creating collaborations that 
could have been relevant to large-scale conflicts.68
In 2011, as part of the lessons of the Lebanon war of 2006, the IDF estab-
lished the Depth Corps.69 The core of the new command was a new Com-
mando Brigade, which was a seminal unification of the IDF commando units. 
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Historically, the IDF’s commando units all operated independently, not under 
a unified command. When the new brigade was established, the three com-
mando units—the Egoz, Maglan, and Duvdevan commandos—were extracted 
from their existing organizational and command affiliations and began train-
ing and operating as a unified fighting force.70 The Commando Brigade uni-
fied these units under one centralized command, making it the most lethal 
synchronized brigade in the IDF, and the most relevant force to combat Hamas 
and Hezbollah.
The reconnaissance units underwent structural and doctrinal changes as well. 
Each of the IDF’s reconnaissance battalions was composed of three companies: 
an antitank company, a sabotage and engineering company, and a reconnaissance 
company. Following the implementation of the GMYP, the missions and training 
routines of these companies changed. The most significant modifications were 
the focus on underground warfare and the replacement of the antitank and sabo-
tage and engineering companies with three identical reconnaissance companies 
in each of the reconnaissance battalions.71 The operational rationale for this was 
that combating Israel’s new unconventional adversaries, which lacked armored 
forces and infrastructure requiring specialized units to handle, demanded differ-
ent capabilities from the reconnaissance units.
Elite units remained separate from the new battle groups even after the other 
special-forces units were reorganized. While the GMYP reduced the size of the 
IDF’s conventional combat forces, the elite units were expanded and allocated 
even more training resources, and their service track was modified. Prior to the 
new service track, male soldiers in the elite units were obligated to serve the same 
three years as other conscripts and then were required to complete an additional 
sixteen to twenty months of training before another three-year service period in 
an elite unit. Soldiers identified as potential commanders during that training 
period continued to Officer’s Cadet School, while the rest of the elite-unit soldiers 
continued their service as noncommissioned officers.72 Following the imple-
mentation of the GMYP, the elite units introduced a new service track. Now, all 
soldiers selected for the elite units would be admitted to Officer’s Cadet School 
and serve for seven consecutive years.73 This change is expected to increase dra-
matically the size of the elite units and help the members of those units be seen 
as professionals rather than conscripted troops.
IDF INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE 
Israeli military intelligence is divided into four core units. The signals-intelligence 
(SIGINT) unit is responsible for intercepting communications and electronic 
signals. The visual-intelligence (VISINT) unit is responsible for mapping hostile 
areas and interpreting images from satellites and other visual resources, such 
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as reconnaissance photographs.74 The human-intelligence (HUMINT) unit is 
responsible for recruiting and handling human assets, and related operations.75 
The research unit is responsible for providing threat warnings of possible hostile 
operations and indications of adversary intentions.
In the past, traditional military targets included military bases, concentrations 
of forces, defense formations, dams, power stations, bridges, and other elements 
of permanent infrastructure. These targets did not require precision targeting, as 
they mostly were large, static, and distant from civilian populations. The intel-
ligence process—researching, collecting, processing, analyzing, and distributing 
finished products—could take months or years to complete. Over time, with 
the declining likelihood of a conventional war and the rising threat of nonstate 
adversaries, military intelligence’s focus shifted. Rather than identifying the ca-
pabilities and intentions of nations, military intelligence’s focus now is on moni-
toring the military proliferation of nonstate adversaries, detecting and alerting 
on imminent threats, and developing methods to obtain and deliver intelligence 
quickly.76 This shift in focus forced the IDF Intelligence Directorate to implement 
new doctrinal and structural changes, as well as to introduce new capabilities to 
remain relevant.
The SIGINT unit, known as 8200 Unit, responsible for intercepting communi-
cations and electronic signals, experienced tremendous growth in recent years. It 
added a cyber unit that specializes in hacking and sabotaging electronic systems, 
and the Hatsav Unit, which collects intelligence from social media platforms.77 
The most significant addition to the SIGINT unit was the establishment of the 
Operational SIGINT Battalion. Intelligence analysts belonging to this battalion 
provide combat forces with real-time intelligence during operations.78 In prac-
tice, this means that intelligence analysts of the Operational SIGINT Battalion 
are annexed temporarily to a field unit for specific missions or operations. They 
join the field unit’s operational control center and synthesize existing information 
with real-time reports from the battlefield and other sources such as drones, cam-
eras, and wiretaps. They communicate their assessments directly to operational 
forces in the field to warn them of imminent threats, verify their observations, 
and support them amid the uncertainty of battle.
The VISINT unit, known as 9900 Unit, also grew significantly. In the 1990s, 
the VISINT unit began expanding its intelligence-collection platforms to include 
human observation and static cameras, as well as vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and, 
most importantly, satellites.79 In 1988, Israel became the eighth country in the 
world to launch a surveillance satellite into space independently. Israel success-
fully launched eight more satellites into orbit over the next three decades. The last 
one, the reconnaissance satellite Ofek 11, was launched in 2016.80 The VISINT 
unit was expanded to develop new techniques for producing intelligence from 
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existing visual images and to cope with the constantly growing flow of visual data 
coming from the new collection resources.81
The IDF Intelligence Directorate also implemented cross-organizational 
changes to be more effective against nonstate adversaries and unconventional ca-
pabilities. In the past, internal groups within the research, SIGINT, VISINT, and 
HUMINT units had been organized around geographic areas or particular stages 
of the intelligence process. Now, for the first time, relevant sections were not 
limited to working on specific 
geographic areas but instead 
were organized to focus on 
organizational or ideological 
targets, such as the Islamic 
Jihad and ISIS. Other sec-
tions were organized by the 
type of threat, such as weap-
ons of mass destruction or 
low-intensity conflict. Finally, 
some units were aligned to different scopes of intelligence: national-level intel-
ligence for the prime minister, strategic-level intelligence for the chief of general 
staff, operational-level intelligence for headquarters and high commands, and 
tactical-level intelligence for combat forces.82
Moving from a geographic paradigm to a capability and organizational one 
necessitated additional reforms to military intelligence. Following the Arab 
Spring, the IDF Intelligence Directorate recognized its failure to anticipate the se-
verity of the uprisings and the regional instability that resulted. As a result, Major 
General Kochavi, then serving as the Military Intelligence director, established 
the Regional Section within the Research Department of the IDF Intelligence Di-
rectorate. The section’s purpose was to investigate and monitor economic, social, 
and political developments, primarily in the Middle East, and identify potential 
geopolitical shifts of strategic significance to Israel. General Kochavi also enacted 
a new approach of assembling ad hoc multidisciplinary teams, subcommittees, 
and provisional headquarters to address time-sensitive threats.83 Lastly, the IDF 
Intelligence Directorate established a new section—the Target Section—to build 
a database of targets using deep-learning algorithms and big data to take advan-
tage of advances in developing information and analyzing trends, patterns, and 
associations. The algorithms can scan billions of data points (e.g., images, videos, 
audio, and electronic signals) to identify potential targets.84 Analysts then can 
investigate the suggested targets, after an initial triage by the algorithms, and 
confirm correct selections, which in turn improves the algorithms’ performance.
[T]he IDF’s transformation and Israel’s  
self-fortification approach to security means 
that the IDF may not be properly prepared  
to contend with evolving complex threats  
as nonstate adversaries grow in size and  
acquire rocket and missile capabilities that 
once belonged only to states.
17
Jager: The Transformation of the Israel Defense Forces
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
 JAG E R  2 9
CYBER
The IDF established its first cyber units in 2011. Initially, the Shin Bet, Israel’s 
civilian internal-security service, was responsible for defending Israel’s critical 
cyber infrastructure. However, the IDF had greater organizational and technical 
capacity to establish and operate larger cyberoperations centers. As the cyber 
threat expanded beyond the capacity of any single agency’s resources into a stra-
tegic, crosscutting dimension of war, the IDF began to prioritize cybersecurity 
and took over responsibility for protecting both Israel’s security and civilian cy-
ber infrastructures. The IDF’s cyber activities were divided between two director-
ates. The Intelligence Directorate was responsible for offensive cyber operations 
and the collection of intelligence; the Computer and Information Technology 
(IT) Directorate was responsible for protecting the military and civilian infra-
structures from attacks.85 The Computer and IT Directorate then was expanded 
to include a new division, the Cyber Defense Division. Subsequently, the name 
of the Computer and IT Directorate was changed to the Computer, IT, and Cyber 
Defense Directorate.
The Cyber Defense Division is responsible for providing defense for air, sea, 
land, and cyberspace, and is the senior authority for cyber protection in the IDF. 
The division protects the IDF’s communication and computing systems and its 
technology-based offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, and it trains all IDF 
forces in countercyber practices and operations. The Cyber Defense Division’s 
primary objective is to prevent electronic information from leaking out of the 
IDF, and it ensures the continuity of IDF operations without IT disruptions.86
The organizational structure of the Cyber Defense Division is unique and re-
flects the unit’s significance within the IDF. A brigadier general was appointed to 
command the division; in the IDF, staff divisions more typically are led by colo-
nels.87 The Cyber Defense Division also, rather than the normal three sections, 
has four—operations, intelligence, technological, and electronic warfare—each 
commanded by an officer at the rank of colonel.88 Finally, the Cyber Defense 
Division was given a unique modular structure in which soldiers could work as 
part of a large task force but also could be annexed to combat branches of the IDF 
to work independently or in small teams.89
Two additional organizations were created to assist the Cyber Defense Divi-
sion in implementing its policies and improving connectivity and cooperation. 
The first was a cyber branch within the IDF multi-corps command headquarters, 
which already had air force, armored, naval and infantry branches. The purpose 
of the cyber branch was to protect offensive and defensive military capabilities 
(e.g., armored personnel carriers, weapons, radars, and computing systems) from 
cyber attacks. In practice, this required ensuring the safety of the entire manu-
facturing process and supply chain, as well as routine checks against malware.90 
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The IDF also established a Cyber Situation Center to manage cyber-related 
emergencies, track international trends in cyberspace, and coordinate between 
the separate cyber units in the IDF.91
The establishment of these organizations and priorities for cyber defense 
marked a significant cultural shift within the IDF. The Israeli military had a long-
standing tradition that prioritized combat units above all others in competitions 
for qualified manpower, budgets, and positions. IDF recruitment protocols dic-
tated that new recruits were directed first to combat units, and only those who 
were not assessed to be qualified for combat duty were directed to noncombat 
units. But by 2011 the IDF prioritized cyber defense as the most pressing need 
within the military, and new recruits who were eligible for combat service but 
also passed cyber units’ requirements were sent directly to the cyber units. 
Moreover, the IDF, for the first time in its short history, launched a program that 
offered eligible soldiers in combat units the option to transfer to a cyber unit.92 
Finally, while combat forces were experiencing a significant reduction in man-
power and the IDF cut five thousand officers, the cyber units were provided with 
a hundred new positions for commissioned and noncommissioned officers in 
2015, in addition to ten thousand new cyber posts already allocated.93
A TRANSFORMED IDF AND  
THE RISKS OF “SELF-FORTIFICATION”
At the center of Israel’s military transformation stands a new, defensive approach. 
Toward the end of the 2010s, Israel’s perception of its military objectives in a 
conflict changed dramatically. Israel no longer sought the total defeat of its op-
ponents or to uproot threats; it now sought to avoid large-scale confrontations 
by showing restraint, carrying out precision strikes, and building multiple layers 
of sophisticated defensive infrastructure and technology to protect itself. This 
defensive, rather than offensive, approach evolved into a new doctrine of “self-
fortification.” Instead of incorporating tactical defensive measures as part of a 
larger offensive effort to combat threats, these tactical measures, often based on 
groundbreaking innovations in military technology, became the principal deter-
rent to Israel’s nonstate adversaries.
Beyond surrounding itself with fences and concrete walls along its borders, 
Israel has integrated advanced technologies to increase the effectiveness of these 
physical barriers. Throughout the years, Israel’s border barriers have been forti-
fied and equipped with day- and night-vision cameras, touch sensors, motion 
detectors, and floating cameras. These measures are reinforced with military 
patrols, human observers, and sand-filled areas near the fence that professional 
military trackers scan for footprints. In some locations, Israel has replaced its 
border fence with concrete and steel walls, particularly in places with a higher 
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risk of infiltration and sniper fire. In 2017, Israel began replacing the border fence 
with Lebanon, which stretches across 130 kilometers, with a nine-meter-high 
concrete wall topped with another three meters of steel fencing.94
A year later, Israel began building the new Israel-Gaza barrier. The six-meter-
high barrier is made of galvanized steel and will stretch across the entire border 
between Israel and the Gaza Strip at completion.95 Under the Israel-Gaza barrier, 
Israel has constructed a belowground concrete wall to protect against infiltration 
tunnels. The underground wall is expected to stretch across the sixty-five kilome-
ters of the Israel-Gaza border. The barrier will consist of concrete and steel and 
will penetrate the ground as deep as thirty meters.96 In 2018, Israel completed the 
construction of a new sea barrier along the maritime border with the Gaza Strip. 
The barrier consists of three layers—a regular breakwater, reinforced stone, and 
barbed wire—all reinforced by smart fences equipped with alarm systems and 
touch sensors, day- and night-vision cameras, and motion detectors.97
Israel has an active, multilayered missile-defense system arrayed against bar-
rage threats from adversary states and militant organizations alike. This includes 
the Arrow 3, Arrow 2, David’s Sling, Iron Dome, and Iron Beam—a newly devel-
oped active missile-defense system that uses concentrated laser waves to intercept 
smaller objects such as mortar shells and small drones. The multilayered defense 
system is under constant development and is expected to provide defense against 
mortar shells; short-, medium-, and long-range surface-to-surface missiles and 
rockets; medium- and long-range conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles; 
and UAVs.
Colonel Yehuda Vach, commander of the Heiram regional brigade of the 
Northern Command and one of the fiercest critics of Israel’s doctrine of self- 
fortification, warns against the illusion of security that it creates: “[A] nation that 
fortifies itself [with fences, barriers, and walls] is a nation that lives in fear. The 
more fences we built across the borders, the more our security doctrine became 
dependent on defense and self-fortification. A society that builds more and more 
fences is a society that lives in fear. Logically, it might seem that fortifications 
project strength but the truth is that it does not[;] if anything, it projects fear.”98 
Through this lens, Israel’s doctrine of self-fortification can be perceived as a 
symptom of national weakness. As Vach observed: “[T]he fighting spirit of the 
military will not be reinforced by physical barriers but by its mental strength. A 
nation that hides, projects mental weakness, is making it easier for the enemy 
to defeat it. . . . [T]he fence creates an illusion, a false perception that [misleads 
people into believing that] they are safe.”99
Major General (Ret.) Yitzhak Brick, who served as IDF chief ombudsman 
and examined the operational readiness of more than a thousand military 
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units during his service, is another fierce critic of the current trend in the IDF. 
Brick criticized political and military leaders for shifting the IDF’s force plan-
ning toward defeating nonstate adversaries and disregarding the possibility of 
a conventional war in the future. According to Brick, “the current misconcep-
tion [among] the IDF military command [is] that there won’t be any more big 
[conventional] wars. They do not consider the possibility that the Middle East 
will change . . . that the Syrians might recover, that the Egyptians will change 
their attitude, nothing. Just a small military for two arenas [the Gaza Strip and 
Lebanon].”100
But Brick believes the IDF still will encounter difficulties facing nonstate ad-
versaries, even with a self-fortification doctrine.
The next war will be a multi-front war against Hamas from Gaza, Hezbollah from 
Lebanon and [at the same time we will have to deal with] missile attacks from Syria 
and perhaps from Iraq. . . . [The next war] will include pounding [heavy missile bar-
rages] of population centers in Israel by hundreds of thousands of rockets. . . . [Israel 
will be] attacked by 1500–2000 missiles every day, . . . among them, missiles with 
600–700 kilogram warheads. . . . [Israel] is facing a serious problem, as it is currently 
incapable of blocking such [heavy, coordinated bombardment]. The air force alone 
cannot do it, as we saw during the previous campaigns in Gaza. Our [anti]missile 
[systems] are not developed enough to deal with such a large number of missiles.101
Senior officers in the IDF have explained that the only way to prevent massive 
and destructive barrages from raining into Israel is to capture temporarily the 
hostile areas from which the shelling is taking place.102 Previous military cam-
paigns in the Gaza Strip and southern Lebanon demonstrated that the air force 
alone, despite its advanced antimissile capabilities, could not prevent missile 
launches into Israel altogether, much less a coordinated missile attack on four 
fronts. Thus, defending Israel effectively from major multiaxis barrages would 
require a major military ground operation in which the IDF captures and con-
trols launching areas in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria and, if need be, extends this 
ground control as far as Iraq or Iran. Because the IDF reduced and deprioritized 
its conventional fighting forces over the past decade, it is reasonable to conclude 
that the IDF is not sufficiently prepared to contend with this worst-case scenario 
and contemporary existential threats to Israel.
Overall, this article provides a primary analysis of recent structural changes 
in the IDF at the tactical level, based on interviews with IDF soldiers, and points 
to five observable trends: decreasing conventional capabilities, investing in and 
developing defensive capabilities, reorientation of the practices and structure 
of IDF combat forces toward guerrilla warfare, prioritizing cyber and intel-
ligence capabilities, and expanding nuclear capabilities in the air and at sea. 
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